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As an apology for asking that the court will rehear
the instant case, we desire to call attention to, but not
magnify, the consequence of this decision as effecting the
contract of insurance in this State if the majority opinion
is adhered to. If it be the purpose and desire of the
court to overrule prior decisions of this court respecting
the iron-safe clause, so well, so good, but we respectfully
submit that when the construction of a contract has been
so uniformly followed by this court as to have ripened
into a rule of stare decisis, the rule should not casually
be changed, but met and considered, and the reasons
which have demanded a different order of construction
should be adverted to.
It is fortunate that in the instant case there is no
conflict in testimony as to the status of the safe at the
time of the fire; the indisputable evidence established it
to have been a fact, that at the time of the fire the iron
safe possessed by the assured in compliance with the
terms of the policy was not locked. We do not believe
that this physical fact is challenged on behalf of the
plaintiff, but, to the contrary, plaintiff's counsel quotes
the plaintiff's son as sayingthat the doorwas open when
the fire was in progress. Therefore with this fact es
tablished, what was the real question presented for solu
tion? Does the issue presented in this appeal concern
merely a question involving the negligence, or freedom
from negligence, of a boy of fifteen when engaged in
closing his father's store, or is the court called upon to
construe agai'n the iron-safe clause of the standard in
surance policy, and to interpret, for the benefit of those
concerned, the meaning of certain language therein found
which hasnever before been construed, so far as we know,
bythisor anycourt, language which under theveryterms
of the contract is made a specific warranty, voluntarily
assumed by the insured?
Notwithstanding the instruction given by the trial
judge, defining the duty of the insured as the holder of
an iron-safe clause policy, counsel for the appellee in
this court, in a very clever brief, haveurged that the sole
question brought under review is the negligence or non-
negligence of the infant son of the claimant when leav
ing the store the night previous to the fire. To be exact
we quote from this brief, page 9:
"Under the law the sole question before thejury was whether the loss of the contents of the safe
was due to the negligence of Donald Peed."
This view seems to have been adopted in the majority opinion; we quote from page 6:
"The testimony hereinbefore summarized raised
one issue to be settled by the jury, %, e., whether the
loss of the books and papers was due to the neg
ligence of Donald Peed, the agent of plaintiff in
charge of the store. If the jury believed his posi
tive statements, as they had a right to do, he was
not guilty of negligence. The fact that several hours
after he had locked the safe the store was seen in
a light blaze and the door of the safe partly open,
is not sufficient as a matter of law to prove that the
young man did not lock it. That is a possible in
ference, but not the only one. It is possible that a
yeggman gained entrance to the store, robbed the
safe and set fire to the building. Either conclusion
is a mere guess."
With profound respect we take issue with learned
counsel, as followed by the court in the majority opinion,
that the question turns solely upon the negligence of
plaintiff's son when locking the store at the close of the
day, and insist that the real question, and the only ques
tion presented for consideration, was as to the fulfill
ment or non-fulfillment of compliance with the iron-safe
clause by the assured which required, and threw upon
the assured the burden to keep the safe mentioned locked
''during the night time and when the store was not open
for business".
We earnestly submit that in view of the uniform
holdings of this court since the iron-safe clause was first
brought under review in the Morgan case, and decided
by Judge Lewis in 1893 (90 Va. 290), that the clause im
poses, as its language expressed, a warroAity, and that
as under the terms of this warranty, the insured assumes
the obligation to keep its records in a safe, locked during
the night, an unlocked safe cannot be said to be a ful
fillment of the policy requirement.
The record in this case does not suggest a doubt
as to the fact that the safe was unlocked at the time of
the fire. The plaintiff did not contend that the safe was
locked at the time, but to the contrary its witness testi-
fied that it was seen to be open when the fire was in
progress. How, then, and under what process of rea
soning can it be contended that the safe was kept lochedf
And yet, this is the warranty, and this warranty must
be performed. Coleman Furniture Co. v. Home Ins. Co.
(Va.), 67 Fed. 2nd, 347; Prudential Fire Ins. Co. v. Al
ley, 104 Ya. 356; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Farris, 116
Va. 880; Scottish Union Ins. Co.v. Virginia Shirt Co.,113
Va. 353.
THE NON-PERFOEMANCE OF A PEOMISSORY
WARRANTY MAY BE EXCUSED IN
CERTAIN CASES.
This has expressly been held in respect to the iron-
safe clause. For instance, as under the facts disclosed
in the Kearney case (180 IJ. S. 132), which is cited and
quoted in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Hudgins,
where the insured attempted to remove the records from
the safe upon the approach of a fire, believingat the time
that in so doing he was securing better protection in ful
fillment of the policy provision than leaving the records
in the safe with the imminent fire approaching, the Court
properly holding the clause had not been breached. Or,
again, for instance, in a case such as suggested in the
minority opinion of Mr. Justice Holt, where the evidence
established that the store had been entered for the pur
pose of robbery, the safe rifled and the property burned,
as was the actual facts disclosed in the case of Brook-
shire V. Chillicothe Town Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 91 Mis
souri App. 599. These cases illustrate and support our
contention in the instant case. But can anything short
of proof of outside agency relieve an insured from a
warranty when once assumed? Can the mere assertion
that *'I locked my safe" relieve me from my contract
obligation to keep my safe locked? And yet, that is ex
actly what has been held in the instant case.
We have never contended, as suggested in the ma
jority opinion, that the existence of the indisputable fact
that the safe was open and unlocked at the time of the
fire was conclusive proof of the breach of the iron safe
clause, but what we have urged, and still urge for the
consideration of this court, is, that where it has been es
tablished that the safeguard against fraud in the policy-
requirement of a locked safe is shown to be absent un
der the admitted facts, and the safe is found to be un
locked when the fire occurred, and this circumstance is
relied upon by the insured as his excuse for the breach
of the policy requirement, that it then devolves upon the
plaintiff and not the defendant—^upon the insured and
not the insurer—^to advance and prove some reasonable
theory respecting the admitted breach of the terms of
the policy which consistently would relieve the insured
from the consequences of such breach. This was the
view adopted by the trial Judge in the instant case as
is plainly shown by Instruction X (Eecord, page 111).
It will be recalled that the plaintiff admitted the absence
of the books and records referred to, giving as his ex
cuse that his son had locked the safe when he left the
store. The court accepted the defense, but at the same
time threw upon the plaintiff the burden of establishing
the cause or excuse for the open door; the breach of
the warranty, and the jury are told:
"That they are not permitted to. indulge in in
ferences not justified by the evidence as to how, or in
what manner the Iron-Safe in which the records were
alleged to have been reposed, was open, or became
open, but if the plaintiff relies upon the fact that
the safe was found open subsequent to the fire caused
by means, or agencies for which he was not respon
sible and that through such means the records in
question were lost or destroyed, such facts must he
established by satisfactory evidence in order for the
plaintiff to avail himself of such explanation and exr
cuse.'*
Could anything short of proof of outside agency be
ing responsible for the admitted breach of the warranty
requiring a locked safe during the night time relieve the
insured from the terms of the warranty under the de
cisions of this court? Surely, if the warranty may be dis-
-charged merely by saying "I locked the door of the safe
when I locked the store", the language of the policy re
quiring the safe to be kept locked is meaningless, and
worthless. A burden is necessarily imposed upon those
who would do away with the consequences of the war
ranty to show some consistent theory for its non-com
pliance. The majority opinion as quoted supra suggests
the possibility that a yeggman may have gained entrance
to the store, robbed the safe and set fire to the building.
Is the assured caJled upon to produce the yeggman,
or other human agency to rebut a physical fact, or is the
insurer? If the burden falls upon the insurer, what be
comes of the warranty carried in the clause that the safe
must be kept locked? An obligation to keep locked, un
accompanied with an obligation to prove compliance,
necessarily negatives the very la'nguage of the warranty
itself.
The contract is not made alone for the honest trader,
but, to the contrary, as this court has repeatedly held,
it was created and has been enforced inviolate to pro
tect the insurer against rascality and fraud. Obviously,
if a fulfillment of the iron-safe clause is satisfied by
proof that the assured or his employee locked the safe
at the close of business, there would be no purpose in
inserting in the language describing the warranty that
the safe should be kept locked, and from a practical
s^ndpoint, if the insured desired to defraud the com
pany, an unlocked iron-safe would be no more effica
cious in securing records than a wooden box or a similar
•non-fire proof container; hence the requirement found in
the clause. As heretofore stated, we have found no case
which holds, or even would tend to support, in our judg-
ment, a holding that the mere locking of a safe per se
was a fulfillment or compliance by the assured with either
the letter or the spirit of an express warranty. The
majority opinion cites in support of its finding the singled
case of Liverpool <& London S Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney
and Wyse, stipra. In addition to this primary authorityj
the opinion carries two references of secondary nature;
namely, 14 R. C. L. 1139-40; 26 C. J. 255. We have ex
amined both the text and the cases cited in support of
the text, and we do not find any expression or decision
which, in our judgment, in any way militates against the
views expressed in the minority opinion. It has never'
been the contention of counsel that observance of the
warranty in question throws upon the assured the burden
to maintain a guard to watch the safe and to protect the
books and papers as stated in the majority opinion from
all hazards We have only contended that if the iron-safe
clause is to remain a warranty upon the part of the as
sured that then, when its breach or non-observance is
shown to have occurred, that it would seem to devolve
upon the insured, and plainly not upon the insurer, to'
prove that the non-fulfillment of the admitted breach
was due to an outside agency rather than that of the as
sured. The Court in deciding the instant case is, in our
judgment, passing upon a vital question of insurance
law; its ruling in effect destroys the force of the war
ranty carried in the policy and reverses the general rule
respecting the burden of proof heretofore adopted where
such has come under review. There are only a few cases
dealing directly with the provision in question in its
present aspect. Aside from the Kearney case and that
heretofore cited in 91 Mo. App. 599, there are two cases
illustrative of the point reported from Texas, the first
decided in 1896 and the last in 1919, namely, the Allred'
case, 37 S. W. 95, and the Kemenho case, 94 Texas 367.
After an examination is made of each one of these cases,
including the Kearney case, it is believed the court will
8conclude that it has been assumed, as a matter of course
in each instance that the burden rested upon the assured
and not the insurer, to present facts or circumstances
which would relieve him from the non-fulfillment of an
admitted warranty, while in the instant case the affirm
ance of the trial Court would seem to carry the paradox
of a warranty discharged by an inference. If we are
correct in this assumption how can we view the majority
opinion otherwise than with alarm, and with fear of its
consequences, as a precedent.
THE ESTABLISHED RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
OF THE WARRANTY IN QUESTION
IN THIS STATE.
In the case of Va.F,<S> M. Ins. Co. v. Morgem (1893),
90Va. 290, Lewis, J., in speaking of the iron-safe clause
said: ''The stipulation is undoubtedly a warranty, made
so by the express contract of the parties, and the jury
ought to have been instructed that a literal compliance
with it was essential to a recovery by the plaintiff." He
then quotes from May onInsurance, language which was
then adopted and approved, and which has since been
accepted as the law governing the rights of the litigant
when the insurance contract has been brought under re
view up to the present case:
" 'An express warranty,' says May, 4s a stipu
lation inserted in writing on the face of the policy,
ontheliteral truth or fulfillment ofwhich the validity
of the entire contract depends. By a warranty the
insured stipulates for the absolute truth of the state
ment made, and the strict compliance with some
prouused line of conduct upon penalty of forfeiture
of his right to recover in case of loss should the
statement prove untrue, or the course of conduct
prowiised he unfulfilled. A warranty is an agree
ment in the nature of a condition precedent, and,
like that, must be strictly complied with.*(Italics
supplied.)
Can the court delete the contract as entered into b^e-
tween the parties so as to take from the contract the plain
and simple requirement that the assured will keep such
books and inventory ''securely locked in a fire-proof safe
at night, and at all times when the premises mentioned in
this policy are not actually open for business" and sub
stitute in place of the language found the simple require
ment that the assured shall lock the safe at the close
of business ? "We are led back to the question upon whom
rests the burden of proof, he who has entered into a war
ranty to perform, or he to whom such warranty is given.
The Morgem case was decided by this court in 1893, and
ten years before, in July, 1882, in the case of LyncJihurg
F, S M. Ins. Co. V. West, 76 Va. 575, this court, in speak
ing of the warranty uses this language (page 582):
''A warranty is a stipulation inserted in a writ
ing on the face of the policy, on the literal truth or
fulfillment of which the validity of the entire con
tract depends."
So that in the Morgem case, after referring to the
West case as the established doctrine in this State, Judge
Lewis attempted to fix or establish, so far as he was con
cerned, the interpretation to be given to the word war
ranty", quoting again from May as follows:
" 'One of the very objects of the warranty,* he
continues, 'is to preclude all controversy about the
materiality or immateriality of the statement. The
only question is, has the warranty been kept? There
is no room for construction, no latitude, no equity.
If the warranty be a statement of facts, it must be
literally true; if a stipulation that a certam act shall
or shall not he done, it must he liferdtly pert
formed.*'* (Italics supplied.)
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In the leading insurance work which was published
in 1931, the learned author Couch (5 Couch, Section
1025), in classifying the attitude or position of the sev
eral States in respect to the construction of the iron-safe
clause, says:
Virginia, an iron-safe clause is a promis
sory warranty, and must be strictly performed. And
the iron-safe-bookeeping clause is not a representa
tion within a statute requiring clear proof that an
swers were wilfully false or fraudulently made, and
the clause is a warranty to be strictly performed.
As a matter of fact there has beefn no substantial
change in the lawin this State respecting warranties dur
ing the last fifty years, if ever. The breach of a war
ranty in Virginia stands exactly as it did at common
law.
Jefries v. Economical Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Wall.
47, 22 L. Ed. 833; Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Ruth
erford, 98 Va. 195; Lynchhurg Fire Ins. Co. v. West, 76
Va. 575.
In the comparatively recent case of North River Ins.
Co. V. Atkinson, 137 Va. 313, decided in 1923, the court
speaking through West, J., again quotes with approval
the section of May, followed by Judge Lewis in 1893 in
the Morga/n case. The court there holding that a war
ranty under the contract of insurance must be literally
true while a representation need be only substantially
true.
But not alone have the decisions in this State been
consistent throughout in construction of themeaning and
effect of the warranty, but, moreover, there has been lit
tle change by statute in Virginia from the common law
rule, and none approaching the situation presented in
the instant case. The common law doctrine of forfeit-
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ures of breach of warranty has been modified but only
to those cases mentioned in Section 4220 of the Code.
By Section 4227 of the Code of 1919 the rule was changed
to read "nor shall failure to perform any condition of
such policy nor a violation of any restrictive provision
thereof, be a valid defense to an action thereon, unless
such failure or violation contributes to the loss sus
tained*'. See Western Assr. Co, v. Stone, 145 Va. 776;
Continental Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 8 Fed. (2) 439. The in
consistencies presented were clarified as shown by Code
1930, Section 427. Thus the Virginia law of today fol
lows the common law doctrine with one exception, i. e.,
that the breach of the warranty must exist at the time
the loss occurs. Hence, given a warranty and a "breach
thereof existing at the time of the loss, there can he no
recovery upon the poUcy regardless of the materiality
of the warranty and regardless of whether or not the
breach contributed to the loss.
In the very recent case of Bergholm v. Peoria Life
Ins. Co., 284 U. S. 489, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in speaking of contracts of insurance, says:
''Contracts of insurance, like other contracts,
must be construed according to the terms which the
parties have used, to be taken amd understood, in
the absence of ambiguity, in their plain ordinary and
popular sense.
''And to discharge the insured from the legal
consequences of a failure to comply with an explicitly
stipulated requirement of the policy, constituting a
condition precedent to the granting of such relief
by the insurer, would be to vary the plain terms of
a contract in utter disregard of long-settled prin
ciples."
And as this court said in Hartford F. Ins. Co. v.
Farris, 116 Va. 880, here quoted in the minority opinion:
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'*The 'iron safe clause' has been over and over
again dealt with and approved in the decisions of
this court as fair both to the insurer and the insured,
and it has been held that the former has the right
to insist on a compliance with this provision of the
policy, for the reasons that the insured contracted
to do so, and that the conditions are reasonable md
if the assured were not required to keep and per
form these conditions it would open wide the door
for the perpetration of frauds and grossest imposi
tion upon insurers." (Italics supplied.)
Torevert back to whatwe have originally said, there
fore, it would seem that the real question presented to
the court for its consideration was not merely the simple
question as to whether young Donald Peed was negli
gent or careless in locking his father's store a-nd the
safe the evening preceding the jSre, but rather the larger
question as to whether the court is prepared to say un
der the admitted facts of this case, that the assured
should be discharged from the consequence of a breach
of the warranty which he had voluntarily assumed to
perform in absence of evidence exonerating Tn'm from re
sponsibility for such breach.
It is our position that the assured has utterly failed
to show that he has complied with the terms of his war
ranty. We are satisfied that no one may read the rec
ord and then entertain any doubt as to the fact that the
safe was not kept locked as stipulated on the night of
the fire. We are not prepared to prove, nor is it en-
cumbent, as we contend, upon the insurer to prove, how
and by what means the safe was opened, if locked. We
contend that this burden belongs to the insured and not
to the insurer, and that any other construction would
impair, if not destroy, the established rule of this court
followed in many cases, requiring observance of the war
ranty.
In conclusion, we desire to call to the attention of
the court that four persons beside young Donald Peed
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knew the combination of the safe, only one of these testi
fied, L. D. Peed. We maintain that the reading of the
record in this case discloses that neither the habits nor
financial condition of the insurer were wholesome, while
the answers of the assured as to judgments obtained
against him were lacking in frankness, if "not false. The
evidence discloses that Peed had ceased to sleep in his
home where other members of his family slept, and was
sleeping at his store when not spending his nights away.
'He was absent from home as testified, the night of the
fire, and it is shown that he was away from home a great
deal, leaving his business to his young son, who was re
quired to work from six to eight, and then subject to
call.
We do not ask that any specific inferences be drawn
from these facts and circumstances against the assured,
but we do submit that a review of the many cases in this
State, as elsewhere, will disclose that where an iron-safe
clause has been invoked, the facts and circumstances
have often been similar in the main as showing bad finari-
cial conditions, and irregularity in habits of the insured
at the time of the loss; and, consequently, we submit
that if the provision of the iron-safe clause was origi
nally prepared, as stated by May in the quotation supra,
to meet certain conditions frequently prevalent, to pre
clude controversy, or as our court has always said, to
prevent fraud, then there is no good reason shown why
the rules of construction should be more liberally ap
plied in the instant case than heretofore followed by
this Court. As we have attempted to show, the policy
heretofore adopted in this State, both through decision
and statute, has been for adherence to the rule of Com
mon Law in respect to a warranty. The desiderata may
be the abandonment of this rule and a definite change of
public policy, but we earnestly submit that there is noth
ing in the facts of this case to justify a change in the
rule, if such be subject to change, in the absence of leg
islative enactment.
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While this court in North River Ins, Co. v. Belcher,
155 Va. 588, held that the adoption of the standard fire
insurance policy and the assumption of control by the
State in matter of forms, etc., under the Acts of 1928,
pages 763, 766, does not change the status of a policy in
respect to rules of construction previously followed, this
court has ever held that however liberally the policy be
construed in favor of the assured, the province of con
struction necessarily rests wholly within the realm of
ambiguity, and, consequently, the policy must be con
strued according to its terms if its terms be clear. The
most recent decision in this respect being Collins v.
Metropolitcm Life (January, 1935), 178 S. B. 40-43. It
is respectfully submitted that in view of the language
of the contract which provides that the assured shall
keep such books, etc., securelylocked in a fire proof safe
at night and at all times when the premises mentioned
in the policy are not actually open for business, and in
asmuch as this clause of the insurance policy has here
tofore been construedby this court and accepted by those
interested in its terms as a promissory warranty, that
a reasonableconstruction of the language found imposes
upon the insured the burden of keeping the safe locked
in accordance with the language found in the contract,
and that the mere testimony of the assured to the effect
that he locked the safe at the close of business cannot be
said to be a fulfillment of the contract obligation with
out doing violence to the language found.
In connection with this application for a rehearing,
there is a circumstance presented at this time out of the
ordinary. Both Eule 17 of the Court and Section 6372
of the Code as amended by the Acts of 1930seem to have
overlooked the possibility of the death or resignation of
one of the Judges subsequent to the decision of the
case and before action upon a petition for rehearing.
The rule as it stands is very liberal to the application
for while the court is composed of seven Judges the
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approval of a single Judge who decided the case adversely
to the applicant brings about a rehearing. It would
seem, therefore, that where the personnel of the Court
has been changed subsequent to the rendition of a de
cision, and this was a decision as stated with all justices
present, that the demise of one of the Judges might be
urged as ground for a rehearing as a matter of right.
But whether this position be sound or otherwise in view
of the situation presented, the importance of the ques
tion respecting its bearing upon the insurance contract
and its relation to previous decisions, rendered by this
court, as well as the conflict in the opinions rendered by
the court in this case, it is sincerely hoped that it may
be the pleasure of the court to grant a rehearing which,
for the reasons stated, is respectfully asked.
Respectfully submitted,
THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO.,
By ALEXANDER H. SANDS,
ROBERT 0. NORRIS.
Counsel.
